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Bit commitment involves the submission of evidence from one party to another so
that the evidence can be used to confirm a later revealed bit value by the first party,
while the second party cannot determine the bit value from the evidence alone. An
unconditionally secure bit commitment protocol utilizing quantum states is presented.
A proper formulation brings out the general condition for successful cheating. Prob-
lems in previous proofs on the general impossibility of quantum bit commitment are
indicated.
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Quantum cryptography [1], the study of information security systems involving quantum
effects, has recently been associated almost exclusively with the cryptographic objective of
key distribution. This is due primarily to the universal acceptance of the general impossibility
of secure quantum bit commitment (QBC), taken to be a consequence of the Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) type entanglement cheating which rules out QBC and other quantum
protocols that have been proposed for various other cryptographic objectives [2]. In a bit
commitment scheme, one party, Adam, provides another party, Babe, with a piece of evidence
that he has chosen a bit b (0 or 1) which is committed to her. Later, Adam would “open” the
commitment: revealing the bit b to Babe and convincing her that it is indeed the committed
bit with the evidence in her possession. The usual concrete example is for Adam to write
down the bit on a piece of paper which is then locked in a safe to be given to Babe, while
keeping for himself the safe key that can be presented later to open the commitment. The
evidence should be binding, i.e., Adam should not be able to change it, and hence the bit,
after it is given to Babe. It should also be concealing, i.e., Babe should not be able to tell from
it what the bit b is. Otherwise, either Adam or Babe would be able to cheat successfully.
In standard cryptography, secure bit commitment is to be achieved either through a
trusted third party or by invoking an unproved assumption on the complexity of certain
computational problem. By utilizing quantum effects, various QBC schemes not involving
a third party have been proposed that were supposed to be “unconditionally secure”, in the
sense that neither Adam nor Babe can cheat with any significant probability of success as a
matter of physical laws. In 1995-1996, a general proof on the impossibility of uncondition-
ally secure QBC and the insecurity of previously proposed protocols were described [3]-[5].
Henceforth, it has been accepted that secure QBC and related objectives are impossible as
a matter of principle [6]-[7].
In this paper, it will be shown that the general impossibility proof is neither mathemat-
ically complete nor sufficiently broadly formulated. An unconditionally secure QBC scheme
is presented that exploits these deficiencies. The results are developed within nonrelativistic
quantum mechanics, unrelated to relativistic protocols [8]. The QBC framework is as follows.
In general, two-way quantum communication between Adam and Babe is allowed. When
Adam picks b = 0 to commit to Babe, he sends her a state jφii 2 HB with probability
2
pi within fixed openly known sets fjφiig and fpig for i 2 f1,    ,Mg. When he picks b
= 1, he sends jφ0ii 2 HB from another fixed openly known set fjφ0iig with probabilities
fp0ig. The states jφii and jφ0ii may be obtained from applying Ui and U 0i by Adam to the
jψi’s sent to him from Babe, for some fixed openly known set of unitary operators fUig
and fU 0ig on HB, but with the jψi’s only known to Babe. The fjφiig and fφ0iig are so
chosen that they are concealing as evidence, i.e., Babe cannot reliably discriminate between
them in optimum binary quantum hypothesis testing [9]. They would also be binding if
Adam is honest and sends them as they are, which he could not change after Babe receives
them. In that case, when Adam reveals the bit by telling exactly which state jφii or jφ0ii
he sent, Babe can measure the corresponding projector to verify the bit. In general, Babe
can always guess the bit with a probability of success PBc =
1
2
, while Adam should not be
able to change a committed bit at all. However, it is meaningful and common to grant
“unconditional security” when the best P¯Bc Babe can achieve is arbitrarily close to 1/2 and
Adam’s best probability of successfully changing a committed bit P¯Ac is arbitrarily close to
zero [4]. In the scenario just described, this would often result from using a sequence of s
qubits (two-dimensional quantum state spaces) with s being a security parameter.
The impossibility proof gives the following general EPR cheat that Adam can launch.
Assume for the moment that the states he sends to Babe originate entirely from him, i.e.,
not in the form Uijψi or U 0i jψi. Instead of sending jφii or jφ0ii, Adam can generate jΦ0i or
jΦ1i depending on b = 0 or 1,
jΦ0i = Σippijeiijφii, jΦ1i = Σi
√
p0ije0iijφ0ii (1)
with fjeiig, fje0iig complete orthonormal in HA, and sends Babe HB while keeping HA
himself. He can, as was argued, switch between jΦ0i and jΦ1i by operation on HA alone,
and thus alter the evidence to suit his choice of b before opening the commitment. In the
case ρB0  trAjΦ0ihΦ0j = ρB1  trAjΦ1ihΦ1j, the switching operation is to be obtained by
using the so-called “Schmidt decomposition” [10], the expansion of jΦ0i and jΦ1i in terms
of the eigenstates jφˆki of ρB0 = ρB1 and the eigenstates jeˆki and jeˆ0ki of ρA0 and ρA1 ,
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jΦ0i = Σkλ1/2k jeˆkijφˆki, jΦ1i = Σkλ1/2k jeˆ0kijφˆki (2)
By applying a unitary UA that brings fjeˆkig to fjeˆ0kig, Adam can select between jΦ0i or jΦ1i
any time before he opens the commitment but after he supposedly commits. When ρB0 and
ρB1 are not equal but close, it was shown that one may transform (1) by an U
A to a jΦ001i
with jhΦ1jΦ001ij as close to 1 as ρB0 is close to ρB1 according to the fidelity F chosen, and thus
the state jΦ001i would serve as the effective EPR cheat.
Among other reasons, it appeared to the present author from his development of a new
cryptographic tool, anonymous quantum key technique [11], that the impossibility proof
is not sufficiently general. It appeared that the possibility mentioned above, that Adam
could only modulate jψi sent to him by Babe and return jφii = Uijψi or jφ0ii = U 0i jψi, is not
included in the framework of the impossibility proof. On the one hand, even without knowing
jψi Adam can form the entanglement by applying the unitary ∑i jeiiheij ⊗ Ui on HA ⊗HB,
with initial state jAi 2 HA satisfying ppi = heijAi. On the other hand, there is a problem
with the impossibility proof with or without anonymous key. Before proceeding, the following
basic property of entanglement important in the present context is first demonstrated.
Theorem (Local State Invariance):
Let ρAB be a state on HA ⊗ HB with marginal states ρA  trBρAB, ρB. The individual
or combined effects of any state transformation and quantum measurement (averaged over
the measurement results) on HA alone leaves ρB invariant.
Proof:
It suffices to consider a pure state jΦi 2 HA ⊗HB in Schmidt form jΦi = ∑k αkjekijφki,
hekjek′i = hφkjφk′i = δkk′ so that ρB = ∑k jαkj2jφkihφkj. The most general operation on
HA can be represented by extending HA to HA ⊗ HA′ with initial state jA0i 2 HA′ , and
applying a unitary U and measuring a complete orthonormal basis fjnihnjg on HA ⊗ HA′
[12]. This results in ρ˜B =
∑
n jnihnjU jΦijA0ihA0jhΦjU yjnihnj so that hφkjρ˜Bjφk′i = jαkj2δkk′ =
hφkjρBjφk′i. The same result obtains when either U or the measurement on fjnihnjg is
omitted.




1 case whatever the ρ’s are. The Schmidt decomposition in the above proof only
simplifies notation and is not essential. This theorem implies that superluminal communi-
cation via quantum entanglement is impossible, which would be obtained if and only if ρB
is changed so that a binary communication channel of classical information with nonzero
channel capacity is created [13]. Observe that the averaging over measurement results in the
theorem is a crucial condition for application to superluminal communication in which the
specific measurement result on HA is unknown to the party with HB.
The operation of unitary transformation with subsequent measurement of an orthonormal
basis is equivalent to the mere measurement of an orthonormal basis fje˜iig on the system.





p˜ijφ˜ii  ΣjppjVjijφji (4)
for a unitary matrix V defined by jeii = Σj Vijje˜ji. Local state invariance is complementary
to the fact from (4) that the obtainable jφ˜ii by operation on HA alone are some proper linear
combinations of the jφii. If Babe verifies the individual jφ0ii, Adam’s successful cheating
probability is
PAc = Σip˜ijhφ˜ijφ0iij2 (5)
When the a priori probabilities p0i can be checked, P
A
c  1 if and only if
p˜i  pi, jφ˜ii  jφii, 8i (6)
where  between pure states is used in the sense of inner product. When not, (6) becomes
jφ˜ii  jφ0ii, 8i 2 J (7)
for some J  f1,    ,Mg such that Σi2J p˜i  1.
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In general, the optimal cheating probability P¯Bc for Babe is given by P¯
B
c = 1−Pe in terms
of the error probability Pe for optimally discriminating between two equiprobable density




(2− kρ0 − ρ1k1) (8)
where k  k1 is the trace norm, kτk1  tr(τ yτ)1/2 for a trace class operator τ [14]-[15]. The
unconditional security problem can be stated as follows, assuming pi = p
0
i = 1/M with no
probability check. The states fφig and fφ0ig are to be sought so that P¯Bc is close to 1/2 while
the optimal P¯Ac is close to zero for sum over any J and any jJ j  jJ j unitary matrix V. In
this formulation the inessential bases are eliminated and one needs only to optimize over V
in determining the largest P¯Ac . However, Adam may face some restriction on the possible
V he can induce, even in principle, and the protocol Y’ presented later in this paper would




1 . The “if”
part follows from the Schmidt decomposition while the “only if” part follows from (3) and
(6). When ρB0 and ρ
B
1 are close but not equal, the impossibility proof effectively claims that
a V can be found so that P¯Ac ! 1.
The gap in the proof may now be observed. By using je˜ii = UAjeii, condition (6) is







1/2j2, so that if F (ρB0 , ρB1 ) is close





is not the relevant measure in determining P¯Bc . One only needs to make kρB0 − ρB1 k1 close
to 0, not F (ρB0 , ρ
B
1 ) close to 1 [16]. The proof would be valid if one can obtain an additional
result of the form: If kρB0 −ρB1 k1 <  then 1−F < δ() where δ() is sufficiently small for the
desired P¯Ac . But the only known relation between k  k1 and F is in the opposite direction
[17],
kρ0 − ρ1k1  2
√
1− F (ρ0, ρ1) (9)
To exploit this gap, consider the following protocol Y:
(I) Adam sends Babe a sequence of s qubits, each in either one of fjφi, jφ0ig, such that an
even number of jφ0i corresponds to b = 0 and an odd number to b = 1, with probability
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1/2s−1 for each sequence of either parity.
(II) Adam opens the commitment by revealing the sequence of s states. Babe verifies by
measuring the corresponding projection on each qubit to see that the entire sequence is
correct.
To show that this scheme is concealing, note that as a consequence of the factorization of
ρB0 −ρB1 into products of individual qubit parts, Babe’s optimum quantum decision reduces to
optimally deciding between jφi and jφ0i for each qubit individually and then seeing whether
there is an even or odd number of jφ0i. The optimum error probability pe for each qubit
is given in [15], and the optimum probability P¯Bc of correct bit decision on the sequence is,








Consider the situation in which Adam can only entangle each qubit individually. He cannot
switch any committed jφi or jφ0i to any other state due to local state invariance which applies
to each of the states he sends separately for that state, expressing the obvious fact here that
there is no entanglement to a single state. The best he can get is
PAc = jhφjφ0ij2 (11)
by generating any sequence of s− 1 states, picking the last one for the bit commitment, and
declaring it to be otherwise when desired. ¿From (10)-(11), one can make PAc = O(n
−1)
and P¯Bc − 1/2 = O(2−n) with s = O(n2). Hence unconditional security is obtained for
large n if (11) is indeed the overall best Adam can do [18]. While I believe protocol Y is
indeed unconditionally secure even when Adam can jointly entangle all the qubits, a proof
by optimization over V or tight upper bounding of (5) is yet to be obtained [19]. However,
(11) can be guaranteed to be the optimal P¯Ac by employing the anonymous quantum key
technique.
Consider the following modification of the above protocol, to be called protocol Y’:
(I’) Babe sends Adam a sequence of s qubit states jψ`i, ` 2 f1,    , sg, proceeding from one
to the next only after she receives back the previous one from him, with each jψ`i being an
7
arbitrary state on a fixed great circle of the Bloch-Poincare sphere.
(II’) Adam modulates each state by doing nothing or rotating the state clockwise by θ(cos θ
2
=
hφjφ0i) on the great circle, corresponding to jφi or jφ0i, and sends it back to Babe.
(III’) Adam commits via sequence parity and opens by revealing his qubit operations. Babe
checks every qubit state.
Under this modification, everything is down to individual qubit level for the following
reasons. Because of the destruction of coherence between qubit states, it is physically obvi-
ous that Adam cannot jointly entangle multiple qubit states from Babe regardless of what
he does jointly on the qubits which he receives and sends back one by one. This also follows
from a direct computation that the most general state Adam can form is a classically cor-
related mixture of individually entangled qubit states except for the last qubit, which can
be disentangled by adding one more qubit to the sequence. Babe can entangle the state she
sends to Adam, but that would be the same as sending independent qubit states when Adam
operates on each qubit independently. Since Adam can only entangle the qubits individually,
he cannot form (1) and his optimum P¯Ac is given by (11). The jψ`i have to be anonymous
to Adam, otherwise he could obtain the entanglement by using his own jψ`i. If he does
that anyway, the optimum probability of getting his own individual qubit state accepted as
correct is 3/4, obtained by measuring a random basis on the great circle of the qubit from
Babe, which goes to zero as (3/4)s in a sequence. This probability of 3/4 can be obtained
by Babe with only a total of four possible states, which is in fact the best possible she can
do. Her optimal choice of jψ`i for P¯Bc is indeed a state on the great circle, as is easily shown
by representing the qubit states in terms of Pauli matrices.
The protocols can be implemented with large-energy coherent states, a significant prac-
tical advantage. As it stands, protocol Y’ is only unconditionally secure in the ideal distur-
bance free limit, which is sufficient for demonstrating the issues in principle as in the case
of previous QBC protocols. There is a sensitivity problem that results from jhφjφ0ij  0,
which obscures the difference in practice between the two cases of detection for verification
or cheating when the state is known or unknown. This sensitivity can be removed by using
product states for jφi and jφ0i, but then it would be difficult to use large-energy coherent
states. It is expected that this and other practical difficulties can be alleviated by the use
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of error correcting codes and/or more complicated hash functions than parity, which should
also help improve the convergence rate of P¯Ac ! 0 [20]. Even when small detection noise is
taken into account for the parity function used in the protocols, one already sees by setting
jhφjφ0ij2 = 1/2 to remove sensitivity, e.g., that the impossibility proof is incorrect in its claim
that P¯Ac ! 1 can always be achieved. Protocol Y’ also suffers from a time delay as compared
to protocol Y. Thus, it is both of theoretical and practical importance to show that protocol
Y is unconditionally secure.
The general strategy of employing anonymous states to restrict Adam’s possibility of
entanglement also works in the ρB0 = ρ
B
1 case. However, such a case usually arises from
equal individual qubit states for Babe and thus Adam only needs to entangle qubit by qubit.
Hence, it is not at all automatic that any previous QBC or other protocol could be modified
to take advantage of this strategy. It seems that the BCJL protocol [21] in which ρB0 6= ρB1
could be so modified, but it suffers from other serious problems.
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